This paper analyzes the impact of the education funding component of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Recovery Act) on public school districts. We use crosssectional differences in district-level Recovery Act funding to investigate the program's impact on staffing, expenditures and debt accumulation. To achieve identification, we use exogenous variation across districts in the allocations of Recovery Act funds for special needs students. We estimate that $1 million of grants to a district had the following effects: expenditures increased by $570 thousand, district employment saw little or no change, and an additional $370 thousand in debt was accumulated. Moreover, 70% of the increase in expenditures came in the form of capital outlays. Next, we build a dynamic, decision theoretic model of a school district's budgeting problem, which we calibrate to district level expenditure and staffing data. The model can qualitatively match the employment and capital expenditure responses from our regressions. We also use the model to conduct policy experiments.
We have four main findings. First, the grants had either zero or else a small education jobs impact. Each $1 million of aid to a district resulted in roughly 1.5 additional jobs at that district.
The point estimate implies that, in the first two school years following passage, the act increased education employment by 95,000 persons nationwide. Moreover, this estimate is not statistically different from zero.
We find no evidence that the grants increased the number of classroom teachers. Intuitively, district administrators may have shown a strong preference for maintaining teacher-student ratios and, to a lesser extent, staff-student ratios. As such, school officials may have found other margins besides firing or hiring along which to cover shortfalls or spend surpluses.
Second, each $1 million of grants to a district increased its expenditures by $570 thousand.
Because districts already had substantial funds from local and state sources, the additional Recovery Act funds were effectively fungible. Thus upon receipt of Recovery Act funds, state and local funding sources may have reduced their own contributions to district funding which offset the act's grants.
Third, districts receiving grants tended to accumulate more debt. Fourth, roughly 70% of the spending increase occurred as capital expenditures, i.e. construction and purchases of land, existing structures and equipment. Why might districts have used these funds for capital improvement?
Since this aid was temporary, school districts may have smoothed the benefits of the aid over time by making long-lived physical investments. In Section 4, we build and calibrate a model of dynamic decision making by a forward-looking school district. We show that the small employment effect and relatively large investment effect falls out of a fully specified and realistic dynamic programming problem.
We also use our theoretical model as a laboratory to understand the effect of different types of policy. Our main finding is that forcing school districts to use all the stimulus money on labor has no additional effect on the employment outcome. School districts that are forced to only use stimulus money on employment reduce the spending they do on labor from state and local funding sources and substitute this shortfall with stimulus money, leaving the net employment outcome unchanged. We show that an alternative policy where school districts are required to spend most of their revenue (both from stimulus plus state and local sources) has a more significant effect on employment.
With respect to existing work, there is almost no economic research on the act's education component. Two exceptions are, Dinerstein, et.al. (2013) , who study the impact of the Act on universities, and Chakrabart and Setren (2011) , who examine the impact of the recession and the early part of the Recovery Act on school districts in the state of New York. More generally, other studies using microeconomic evidence that study the overall Recovery Act's impact have focused mainly on economy-wide labor market outcomes. These include Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) , Conley and Dupor (2013) , Dupor and McCrory (2015) , Feyrer and Sacerdote (2012) and Wilson 3 (2012) .
Another line of research studies how federal grants to schools influence school spending. Gordon (2004) studies the impact of additional federal grants to school districts serving economically disadvantaged children, through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. She finds that, although the additional federal grants initially caused a dollar-for-dollar increase in school spending, over time school districts offset those increases with reductions in their own contributions to education funding. Lundqvist, Dahlberg and Mörk (2014) study the impact of intergovernmental grants to local governments in Sweden and find that the grants do not stimulate local public employment. Evans and Owens (2007) study the extent to which federal grants to fund new police hires increased the size of local police forces versus simply supplanted local funding. They found that for every four officers payrolled by a grant, in an accounting sense, a police force actually only increased by a little over two officers.
Empirical Analysis

The Data
The Sample
Our unit of observation is a public school district. 6 During the 2010SY, there were 16,117 such districts in the U.S. We restrict attention to districts with more than 500 student during that year.
After additionally excluding districts missing requisite data, we are left with 6,786 districts. Let Y j,k denote employment by district j during school year k. Then,
6 Our usage of the term school district is synonymous with the term "local education agency" (LEA), used in the education policy area. In the education policy jargon, our sample is made up of school districts and a small number of regional educational service agencies.
7 For example, we were forced to exclude data from all districts in Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Vermont because the Recovery Act spending information was reported in a manner that did not allow us to match them to school district spending and employment variables. We also excluded Hawaii because the entire state is a single school district. 8 We exclude the 2008SY because it includes only a few months in which the Recovery Act was in effect.
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where Pop j is the district j enrollment in the 2007SY.
From the annual Local Education Agency Finance Survey, we have data on total expenditures S j,t and debt. From these variables, we calculate our next two outcome variables. We measure expenditure as the per student cummulative spending in the 2009SY and 2010SY relative to a pre-act baseline.
Debt accumulation is the change in the per student debt of a district over two school years following the act's passage.
First, letṼ j be the Recovery Act dollars outlaid to school district j, from enactment through 2011Q2. 9 Outlaid dollars are defined as dollars paid by the federal government to a recipient organization. These amounts are constructed using quarterly reports filed by recipients to the web site FederalReporting.gov. 10 Finally, we scale by the district enrollment and report values in millions of dollars:
Nearly all of the education dollars authorized by the act were outlaid by the end of 2011Q2.
Instrument Variables (V SN and V SEF )
Since the allocation of the Act's school funding was perhaps in part endogenous, we employ instrumental variables. We have two instruments. Our first instrument is the per student value of special education funding outlaid as part of the Recovery Act, defined as V SEF j , through 2011Q2.
The main channel by which the federal government supports special education is through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a comprehensive statute originally passed in 1990 to ensure all students with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate education. Most of the Recovery Act special education money was tied to the IDEA program. While there are several subprograms within IDEA, the lion's share of monies comes through Part B of IDEA. The Recovery Act funding formula follows the IDEA Part B formula. 11
Recovery Act IDEA Part B grants were add-ons to regular annual IDEA Part B grants to states. The national federal fiscal year (FFY) 2009 regular grant amount was $11.5 billion. The 9 We use outlays through 2011Q2 because this aligns our Recovery Act data sample with the end of the 2010 school year.
10 After processing and data verification by the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, these data were posted on the web site Recovery.gov. A user's guide for these data is contained in Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (2009).
11 See U.S. Dept. of Education (2009b) and New America Foundation (2014).
5 first $3.1 billion (both from regular funding and the Recovery Act add-on) was divided up amongst states so that they were guaranteed to receive their FFY1999 awards. Once this requirement was met, the remaining part of the national award was allocated among the states according to the following rule: "85% are allocated to States on the basis of their relative populations of children aged 3 through 21 who are the same age as children with disabilities for whom the State ensures the availability of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and 15% on the relative populations of children of those ages who are living in poverty." 12 The Recovery Act add-on totaled $11.3 billion.
Since, at the margin, the FY1999 requirements had already been met by the regular awards, every
Recovery Act dollar was in effect assigned across according to the 85/15 percent rule.
Next and importantly, we address how funds were assigned from state education agencies to local education agencies (LEA). These initial allocations too were made at the federal level. Each LEA was first allocated a minimum of its FFY1999 award. Based on the legislation and given the low set of R 2 above, we conclude that the primary reason that IDEA money was allocated differently from the formulary rule is that some states were able to meet their funding requirements of special needs students in some districts without drawing on Recovery Act IDEA funds. Those funds were then reallocated to districts with additional funding requirements for special needs students. Differences in funding requirements across districts were likely due to factors, such as the number of special needs students, the types of disabilities and their associated costs and the districts' own funding contributions for providing the services to these special needs students. Our exogenity assumption is that this set of factors driving redistributions of IDEA funds is orthogonal to the error term in second stage equation.
Our second instrument is the ratio of the number of special needs students within a district relative to the overall student enrollment in that district in 2007. 15 Denote this variable as V SN j .
While the fraction of special needs students in a school district is likely to impact the Recovery Act funding that a district receives, it is plausibly uncorrelated with the business cycle conditions and tax revenue stress that the district faced.
Conditioning Variables (X)
We include the following conditioning variables, which we partition into three types:
• Pre-recession education variables: the 2007SY values of the teacher-student ratio, staffstudent ratio, expenditure per pupil; the change in debt per pupil over the 2007SY;
• Non-financial variables: the ratio of African American plus Hispanic enrollment to overall enrollment, the natural log of enrollment, 7 region dummy variables, a constant;
• School district financials: the poverty rate, the fraction of revenue from local sources, the cumulative change in revenue from non-federal sources Notes: The unit of observation is a U.S. school district. The above sample excludes districts with enrollments less than 500 in the 2010SY. † denotes variable has been divided through by 1000. IDEA, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; SD, standard deviation; pp, per pupil.
Details regarding a few of these variables are in order. The poverty rate is the number of young persons living in poverty relative to the overall population of persons living within each school district's borders. The change in revenue from non-federal sources variable is given by
where R nonf ed j,k is the district j revenue from nonfederal sources in school year k. The primary nonfederal sources are from within the district and the state government.
Summary statistics for the variables in our analysis appear in Table 1 .
The econometric model
We use two-stage least squares in estimation. The statistical model for the ∆Job-years equation is
∆Job-years j = β JYVj + γX j + ε j 8 whereV j are the fitted values from the first-stage regression.
The parameter of interest is β JY . The statistical model for the other two outcome variables simply replaces ∆Job-years j with ∆Expenditure j or Debt Accum j . Our estimates are weighted by district enrollment and we report robust standard errors.
Results
Benchmark results
The employment effect Table 2 contains our benchmark estimates. We report the job-years response to grants in column (i). The coefficient on education spending equals 1.47 (SE=1.32): Every $1 million in grants increased district employment by 1.47 relative to a no Recovery Act baseline. Note that our construction of the outcome variable is such that one job should be interpreted as lasting one year. This estimate is not statistically different from zero, but estimated sufficiently precisely to conclude that the jobs effect was small at best. At the upper end of the 95% confidence interval, the employment effect was 4.05 persons per million dollars spent. We view this as quantitatively small bearing in mind that the average education industry wage was roughly $50,000 during this period. 16 The estimates for other outcome variables, presented below, elucidate two reasons why there was a small, if any, education jobs effect. First, a large portion of the grants did not translate into greater district-level expenditures. Second, district level expenditures that did arise from the grants were mainly used for capital expenditures.
Next, using the job-years response estimate, we calculate the implied total number of education job-years resulting from the act's education component. Taken at the upper end of its 95% confidence interval, our estimate is that the effect was 260,000 jobs. 17 As explained in the introduction, this is substantially lower than the corresponding number based on payroll count data reported at Recovery.gov. 18
The bottom rows of Our jobs effect finding begs the question: Why were so few, if any, education jobs created as a result of the act? One possibility is that district administrators viewed their staff, and in particular teachers, as so important to their mission that districts receiving relatively little aid 16 The mean annual wage for U.S. workers in the "Education, Training and Library" occupation was $49,530 in 2009. 17 We calculate this number by multiplying the 95% upper bound of the job-years coefficient confidence interval by the cumulative total Recovery Act education spending through the 2010SY. This calculation assumes that the treatment effect is the same for districts within our sample as those excluded from the sample.
18 See Table A .1 for a tabulation of the Council of Economic Advisers payroll count data. found ways to close budget gaps without firing many staff. Also, districts that received relatively generous Recovery Act grants may have been less willing to hire new staff for risk that, once the short-lived grants were spent, the new staff would need to be let go. Adjusting the capital outlays was an alternative way to spend grant dollars. We provide empirical evidence of and theoretical justification for a capital outlay response later in the paper.
If neither large grant nor small grant districts significantly adjusted their staff levels in response to the shock, then we should expect our IV estimates to reflect a small jobs effect. An absence of significant changes in staffing levels is consistent with narrative descriptions of districts' responses to the most recent recession. Cavanaugh (2011) explains that school officials initially responded to budget stress caused by the recession "at the periphery," e.g., cutting travel, delaying equipment upgrades as well as scaling back extracurricular activities, art and music programs. As further evidence, based on surveys of school administrators, AASA (2012) lists many ways that school administrators filled budget gaps during the period without firing employees. These include furloughing personnel, eliminating or delaying instructional improvement initiatives, deferring textbook purchases and reducing high cost course offering. While each of these may have marginally reduced the quality of education services provided by the schools, the changes did not directly impact the total number of district employees.
Note that if there was job creation outside of district employment, perhaps because of a "Keynesian multiplier" effect, this is not reflected in our estimates because we examine only school district employment.
The expenditure effect
Column (ii) of Table 2 reports estimates for the ∆Expenditure specification. The point estimate on Recovery Act education spending equals 570 (SE=197) thousand. This implies that $1 million of education grants resulted in an increase in expenditures of approximately $570 thousand over the first two full school years following the act's passage. Thus, only about one-half of aid to a district actually translated into more expenditures in that district. One explanation for this result may be that there was substantial "crowding-out" of local and state governments' contribution to public education when school districts received Recovery Act dollars.
This findings relates to previous research on whether federal grants crowd out state and local spending. In a simple political economy model, Bradford and Oates (1971) shows conditions under which crowding out occurs. Leduc and Wilson (2013) present evidence that crowding out was not a problem for the highway component of the Recovery Act.
The debt accumulation effect
Column (iii) of Table 3 gives the responses of the outcome variables for several variations on the benchmark specification. Panels A and B provide the weighted and unweighted specifications, respectively. The first row contains the benchmark estimates. The "Ordinary least squares" row is identical to the benchmark specification except we estimate via OLS rather than instrumental variables. The next two rows estimate the model for each instrument separately. The final two rows sequentially drop the region dummies and then drop all lagged variables.
Additional results
Column (i) of Table 3 presents the job years estimates for all of the alternative specifications.
The majority of estimates are close to the benchmark one. There are three things worth noting.
First, not weighting by enrollment has very little effect on the estimate. Second, the OLS estimate is very similar to our benchmark IV case. This suggests that the endogeniety problem is not severe in this case.
Third, instrumenting with only the special education ratio generates a substantial increase in the jobs as well as the expenditure effect relative to the benchmark specification. The job years estimate increases to 8.04 (SE = 7.36). Note that we are unable to reject a zero jobs effect for this specification. This specification results in the strongest jobs and expenditure effects of all of the alternative estimated models. Interestingly, the large jobs and expenditure effects are diminished substantially in the corresponding unweighted estimates (see panel B).
Column (ii) of Table 3 presents the total expenditure estimates. Recall that the coefficient is interpreted as the thousands of dollars by which expenditures increase for a $1 million Recovery Act education grant to the district. Thus, if the value is less than 1,000, then there is some "crowding out" of the grants because part of the aid is not passing through to expenditures. The majority of estimates are close to the benchmark one and exhibit substantial crowding out.
Column (iii) of Table 3 presents the debt accumulation estimates. The benchmark estimate shows a statistically significant positive effect. All of the alternative specifications have a positive point estimate, with roughly one-half being statistically different from zero. The only outliers are the "special education instrument only" cases, both weighted and unweighted. The point estimates for these specifications jump to $4.0 million and $8.5 million respectively. We view these values as implausibly large.
Column (iv) of the table contains the partial F -statistic for each specification. None of the values indicate a weak instrument problem, although the statistic is dramatically lower for the "special education instrument only" specifications.
Next, we consider what type of education jobs were impacted. Did the grants create and save teachers jobs or those of other employees? Table 4 presents the estimates for the benchmark specification, except we estimate the equation separately for the change in the number of teaching and non-teaching employees.
Column (i) of Table 4 shows that there was no statistically significant effect on the number of teacher jobs created/saved. The point estimate equals -0.03 (SE = 0.51). District administrators may have sought, as a top priority, to maintain class sizes at their pre-recession levels. This constancy may have been achieved by neither hiring nor firing teachers on net.
The employment effect came through non-teacher jobs. As seen in column (ii), each $1 million resulted in 1.50 (SE = 0.99) additional job-years of non-teacher employment, although this too is not statistically different from zero.
Next, Table 5 examines the categories of spending that account for most of the effect on total expenditures. In columns (ii) through (iv), we estimate the benchmark model except we in turn replace the change in total expenditures with the change in a component of total expenditures.
Column (ii) shows that there is a substantial effect on capital outlays of Recovery Act aid.
Roughly 70% of all expenditures came in the form of capital outlays. 19 Why might districts have used so much of their grant money for investments? First, suppose a district seeks to maximize its provision of education services as well as keep those provided services relatively smooth over time, in a similar manner as the permanent income model of consumption smoothing. Second, suppose education services are a function of labor, i.e. the number of staff, and capital. In this case, a district that receives a one-time grant may seek to spread the benefits of this grant over many periods by using a part of its grant to increase its capital stock.
Likewise, a district that received a relatively small amount of aid may have found that the best way to close budget gaps was to temporarily cut back on investment in capital rather than layoff staff. Because the capital stock depreciates slowly, a temporary interruption in investment would likely have only a small effect on the quality of education services that the school could provide.
Recall that earlier in the paper, we document that Recovery Act aid tended to increase debt accumulation. This effect may be related to the positive effect of aid on capital expenditure seen in Note that the construction spending itself is likely to have a positive jobs effect because of building contractors the district might hire. These numbers are not reflected in our employment estimate because we restrict attention to school district employees. 20
Column (iii) of Table 5 reports the impact of aid on salaries, which was small and not statistically different from zero. 21 Since the employment effect was so small, it is not surprising that we do not recover a substantial wage effect. Column (iv) of Table 5 implies that $1 million in aid increased benefits paid by the school district by $79 million.
A model of school district hiring and capital decisions
In this section, we study the dynamic optimization problem of a school district facing stochastic revenue shocks.
In the previous section, we found that the ratio of stimulus spending for paying education workers relative to capital investment was 0.25. This may be puzzling since, as we explain below, the long run average of this ratio equals 8. Second, there was a small effect on non-teacher staffing and no effect on the number of teachers employed. Our model simulations will roughly match both of these findings. Moreover, our model allows us to estimate the medium and long-run effects of these grants and provides a laboratory to study the effects of alternative hypothetical stimulus programs aimed at schools.
The stylized facts
We begin by documenting two stylized facts about education spending by analyzing a 17 year panel of district-level data ending with the 2011SY. 22 The facts provide guidance for building and then calibrating our economic model.
Our panel covers a long time span and some of our series contain time trends. As such, we detrend every variable x t by its aggregate (over districts) gross growth rate between period t and Q, the final period in our sample. The cumulative growth rate is:
where I is the set of all districts. The detrended district level variable is thenx t is thus
Unless otherwise noted, each variable is scaled by its district enrollment.
Stylized Fact 1: The teacher to student ratio is less volatile than the non-teacher to student ratio.
For each district i, we compute the time series variance of the log deviation of the employment levels of teachers, T , and non-teaching workers, N . 23
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 6 contain the across-district median value (along with the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentile values) of v T,i and v N,i . Observe that the non-teacher/student ratio is more variable than the teacher/student ratio. The difference in variability ranges from 3 times as high for the 10th percentile, 4 times as high for the median, and over 5 times as high for the 90th percentile.
As further robustness, columns (iii)-(iv) contain the statistics for a smaller subsample that includes data from the most recent 6 years. Whereas the shorter time horizon results in a reduced value of the magnitude of the variance, as in the full sample in this subsample, the teacher/student ratio remains less variable than the non-teacher/student ratio. Stylized Fact 2: Capital spending is more volatile than that of labor.
Next, we consider the behavior of two categories of spending: capital expenditure and labor expenditure. Capital expenditure is the sum of spending on construction, land and existing structures, and equipment with an expected life of 5 or more years. Labor expenditures includes salaries and benefits of district employees. 24 We convert each variable into real terms using the GDP deflator with a base year of 2011. Table 7 reports the across-district median value (along with the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentile values) of the time-series volatility of expenditures on total real salary plus benefits and real capital outlays, where each volatility is calculated as the time-series variance of the log deviations of the variable from its aggregate trend using (4.1). Note that investment is significantly more variable than labor expenditures. At the median level of variability, expenditure on capital is 250 times more variable than expenditures on labor.
Next, we break the capital category into spending of two types: construction, land, and existing structures (CLS) and equipment. Table 8 reports the volatility of these variables. Even though equipment itself is volatile, most of the volatility in capital is driven by CLS. This fact coupled with the facts that CLS makes up roughly 80% of all capital investment and that labor expenditure is not very volatile pushes us towards a theory in which districts tend to use large revenue gains and make-up for revenue shortfalls by largely either investing in, or delaying expenditure on, long lived capital goods.
The economic model
Consider a school district that uses an exogenous stream of revenue, R, to hire workers and buy capital to provide education services to its students. Its revenue process is given by the following AR(1) process:
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) andR is fixed. Revenue, as well as other variables in the model, are per pupil.
A district's one-period welfare function is
where T, N, and K are the number of teachers, number of non-teachers, and quantity of capital, respectively. Moreover, let U (X; ξ) = X 1−ξ / (1 − ξ).
The district's dynamic optimization problem is given by the following recursive functional equation:
and non-negativity constraints on T, N and K. Also, I represents investment in the capital good and values with a prime subscript give the next period realization of that variable. For example, K ′ gives the next period realization of capital, K.
Next, (4.3) is the district budget constraint, with w T and w N representing the teacher wage and non-teacher wage, respectively. Also, (4.4) is the capital law of motion and δ is the capital depreciation rate.
Every period the school district receives revenue which it optimally allocates to the hiring of teacher and non-teachers, and capital acquisition. Whereas the amount of teachers and non-teachers hired effect only the current period's welfare, the durable nature of capital results in it having a multi-period effect. As we discuss in the next section, the dynamics that result from allowing the district to choose a durable input are important for understanding why the 2009 Recovery Act had a small effect on hiring, but a large effect on capital outlays.
Calibration and simulations
The parameter values for the model are given in Table 9 . The model period is equal to 1 year. We begin our calibration by setting the discount factor β = 0.96 to match a 4% annual real interest rate.
Next, in the data, the capital stock is comprised of two different basic types: equipment with more than a 5 year lifespan and CLS. CLS account for roughly 75% of the capital outlays and depreciate at a 1.88% annual rate, while equipment accounts for 25% of capital outlays and depreciate at a 15% annual rate. 25 As such, we set the δ = 0.0516 (= 0.75 × 0.0133 + 0.25 × 0.16).
25 See BEA Depreciation Estimates at http://www.bea.gov/national/FA2004/Tablecandtext.pdf Across districts, the median wage bill per student is $8128, for which 48% go towards teacher pay and 52% go towards non-teaching staff pay. Teacher compensation per pupil is thus $3901 and non-teaching staff compensation equals $4227. The median teacher-student ratio is 1/15.5 and the median number of non-teachers staff per student is 1/16. As a result we set teacher and non-teacher wage w T = $60472 (= 15.5 × 3901) and w N = $67625 (= 16 × 4227).
The persistence of the AR(1) revenue process is directly estimated from the data. The median auto-correlation of expenditures is 0.47. The average revenue is set atR = $8128 + $988 = $9116.
Six parameters remain: The welfare elasticities (ξ T , ξ N and ξ K ), the relative shares of teachers, α, and non-teachers, γ, and the standard deviation of the revenue process, σ R .
First, we set ξ K = 1 and then jointly calibrate the remaining five parameters to match the following five targets: The average teacher/student ratio is 0.064; the average non-teacher/student ratio is 0.062; the non-teacher/student ratio is 4 times as volatile as the teacher/student ratio; the average salary volatility equals 0.0036; and the average investment volatility 0.95. 
The effect of a Recovery Act size shock
To simulate the effects of the Recovery Act, we alter equation (4.3) to be:
where A gives the net magnitude of the Recovery Act shock to revenue after accounting for any loss in revenue at the district level. From our benchmark regression analysis in Table 2 , we estimate the size of this shock to be $570 per student. As a result, we set A = $570 in the period of the shock and A = $0 otherwise. For a transparent comparison with our regression results, all of our results below are for a $1 million shock. In the data, the gross magnitude of the Recovery Act shock before accounting for any loss in revenue at the district level was approximately $1000 per student. As a result, to find the $1 million response we multiply the per student values by 1000. The large effect on investment is driven by a motive to smooth the value of education inputs over time. For the purpose of intuition, suppose a school district had two mutually exclusive uses of new funds: (1) increasing the number of staff for one year, or (2) engaging in additional investment for one year. The latter option leads to more capital in the short and intermediate run which increases education services. Also, since the capital is now higher, the district can cut back marginally on investment in periods after the shock and use the funds saved to increase its staffing levels. The latter option leads to an increased and smoother path of inputs over time, as well as higher welfare.
To illustrate this effect, Figure 1 plots plot the responses of the district in an calibration where δ = 1.0, i.e. capital depreciates fully after one period. As seen in the figure, once the district loses access to interperiod savings, the employment effect rises.
Note that our environment does not permit the district to smooth the benefit of the revenue shock over time using savings or similarly deficit reduction. If we extended the model to permit these options, districts would use these financial instruments as well as capital accumulation in an optimal policy. Note, however, that our regression results instead find that deficits increased upon receipt of Recovery Act grants. As explained earlier, the deficit results may be a result of districts pairing new capital spending with increased leverage through higher debt levels.
Next, one of our stylized facts was that the volatility of the number of teachers is significantly lower than that of non-teachers. We conjecture that this occurs because there may be little flexibility in hiring or laying off teachers. Consider a school that teaches five subjects -math, English, Spanish, social studies, and science -to 80 students and currently hires one teacher for each subject. This school may be unable to lay off a teacher because doing so would lead to one fewer subject being taught. If it wanted to add one teacher, the additional teacher could not teach a bit of all five subjects. Thus, the marginal benefit of hiring one extra, say math, teacher is very low. On the other hand, hiring non-teaching staff across the district likely would not face a classroom indivisibilty constraints. The relatively low volatility of teacher employment can be achieved in the model with a high value of ξ T relative to ξ N . Thus ξ T > ξ N proxies for a relatively low flexibility in changing Our model also permits us to estimate the shock's long-run effects. As discussed above, the initial effect of the shock is driven largely by an education-services smoothing motive which results in accumulating capital initially. This, in turn, frees up future resources for hiring teachers and non-teachers. As seen in Figure 1 , the cummulative ten year effect is approximately two teachers and four non-teachers per million dollars spent. Note that these effect are larger than the two year effect. The long run effect still dwarfs the CEA's estimate that over 750,000 education jobs were created/saved by the act. At 2.25 jobs per $1 million in 2 years and 6 jobs per million in 10 years, the $64.7 billion spent by the Department of Education creates 146,000 jobs in the first two years and 388,000 jobs in the first ten years following the act's passage.
Policy Analysis
Our model provides a laboratory to study the effects of alternative ways to implement a stimulus program. First, a simple, and it turns out simplistic, policy would require all districts to use stimulus money on employment only, i.e.
Figure 2 plots the response to this policy. The policy has no effect, relative to the "no constraint"
case presented above. This is because a district's existing revenue and the stimulus money are fungible. In response to a stimulus shock, a district can cut back on using its existing revenue to pay labor and instead use the stimulus money to hire workers. The district would meet the requirement of using stimulus money to hire workers and maintain the no constraint outcome.
Consider an alternative policy where, instead, the federal government requires that in the period of the shock:
where φ gives the percentage of the all revenue that must be used to pay workers. We simulate the model under this policy, setting φ = 0.875, which we find achieves the maximum employment effect (while keeping investment constant). Figure 3 gives the results of this exercise. This has a significantly larger response of 9 new jobs (3 teaching + 6 non-teaching) in the year of the shock. As seen in the figure, as an optimal policy, the government should impose a larger percentage of revenue used on labor for districts with lower revenues and high levels of capital. Districts with lower levels of revenue in particular are motivated to use the additional stimulus revenue they receive from the government on capital.
Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of countercyclical government spending on the education sector.
Empirically, we find that the Recovery Act's education component had a small impact on nonteacher employment, no effect on teacher staff levels, and a substantially less than one-for-one response of district level expenditures. To the extent that government grants increased district expenditures, the increases largely took the form of capital outlays. The grants also stimulated district debt accumulation.
These findings should not be entirely surprising given the decentralized nature of the act's implementation plan. The allocation process was multi-tiered, with local and state governments having latitude regarding how Recovery Act dollars were spent. First, state governments maintained substantial control over how they spent their own revenue. This created an environment where stimulus dollars might be used to replace state contributions. 27
After passing through the state-level, the Recovery Act dollars were spent by individual districts largely at their own discretion. Given that the stimulus dollars were temporary, districts had incentive to smooth out the spike in additional education services that they could provide by investing in equipment and structures. This objective is one potential explanation for the small education jobs effect that we estimate in this paper.
27 As Inman (2010) writes, "States are important 'agents' for federal macro-policy, but agents with their own needs and objectives." 
